TEL AVIV, Israel โ€” Conflicts of interest and lax oversight led government-owned Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. (IAI) to continue to invest state resources in a money-losing commercial satellite imaging venture, according to the nationโ€™s top watchdog agency.

In its 2005 annual report, released Aug. 31, Israelโ€™s comptroller general leveled harsh criticism at IAI for what it claimed was a series of improper business decisions in support of ImageSat International, owner and operator of the Eros-A high-resolution imaging spacecraft. IAI established ImageSat in 1997, along with other investors, as a vehicle for promoting and securing orders for IAI-produced satellites.

According to the report, IAI not only failed to recoup its initial $42.3 million investment in ImageSat, but registered $36.7 million in losses for its estimated 40-percent share of the company. Additionally, government investigators disclosed that IAI extended $39 million in credit to ImageSat to help underwrite its newest Eros-B imaging satellite without seeking or securing the approval of IAIโ€™s board of directors.

The comptrollerโ€™s disclosure of Eros-related losses appears to contradict earlier ImageSat claims of an operational surplus that allowed it to fund Eros-B , planned for launch in early 2006, through its own reserves and private-sector loans.

โ€œThis company is cash flow positive. We looked at our revenue stream and determined it was sufficient to keep Eros-C [the firmโ€™s third planned satellite] on a low flame and fund Eros-B from our own cash flow operations surplus together with a bank loan,โ€ ImageSat president Menashe Broder said in a June 2004 interview.

ImageSat, which is preparing its first public stock offering in the United States, declined to explain the apparent discrepancy when contacted Sept. 5. โ€œImageSat is a privately owned firm and we wonโ€™t discuss our financial affairs,โ€ company spokeswoman Karen Gold-Anisfeld said. She also said the firm does not disclose the identities of its investors or their equity in the satellite venture.

โ€œWe must view these things amid the fact that IAI at the same time serves as the provider and also a shareholder of a customer โ€ฆ The situation in which senior managers at IAI serve in senior positions in [ImageSat] is problematic and embedded by suspicions of conflict of interest, the results of which can not be overcome through the existing arrangement,โ€ the comptrollerโ€™s report charged.

It upbraided IAI managers for flawed strategic planning, misplaced adherence to โ€œoverly optimisticโ€ market projections and for not providing its board a detailed assessment โ€œof why, from the perspective of IAI, it was worthwhile to continue to promote the [ImageSat] business plan in light of changes that were decided from time to time.โ€

In a March 1999 business plan prepared for prospective customers and investors, ImageSat โ€” then called West Indian Space Ltd. โ€” advertised a program to launch and operate a constellation of eight Eros satellites by the end of 2004. The company now envisions launch of its second satellite, Eros-B, in early 2006, followed by Eros-C prior to 2008.

Finally, the report insisted IAI should have learned from similar mistakes made in the context of the Amos commercial communications satellite venture , which resulted in huge losses for the firm.

A prepared statement dated Aug. 29 โ€” two days prior to the release of the comptrollerโ€™s report โ€” IAI defended its decision in the late 1990s to establish ImageSat together with other partners as a vehicle for entering the emerging satellite Earth-imaging market. IAI insisted that ImageSat has generated โ€œsignificant revenueโ€ since the December 2000 launch of the Eros-A. Nevertheless, IAI acknowledged that after five years of space operations, โ€œImageSat is still in an investment phase with respect to its [planned] network of satellites.โ€

With regard to charges of unsupported, overly optimistic market projections, IAI said: โ€œIt is natural and understandable that forecasts, which were evaluated thoroughly and methodically and upon which the business plan was based, were only partially fulfilled.โ€

The company said Moshe Keret would continue to serve as top manager at IAI as well as chairman of ImageSat. However, โ€œIAI wishes to clarify that in order to prevent a situation of a conflict of interests, [Keret] delegated his authorities with respect to ImageSat to IAIโ€™s corporate vice president and general counsel, and to IAIโ€™s corporate vice president for finance.โ€

Despite efforts to reduce the appearance of conflict between ImageSat and IAI, the two firms continue to share senior executives. ImageSat recently announced that Broder, a former IAI executive, would be replaced by Shimon Eckhaus, who until early this summer served as corporate vice president for marketing and business development at IAI.

ImageSatโ€™s 250-kilogram Eros-A imaging satellite, built by IAI, is based on technologies developed by IAI and other Israeli firms for the nationโ€™s Ofeq spy satellite.